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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
11 U.S.C. § 363 allows a debtor to sell substantially all 
of its assets outside a plan of reorganization.  In modern 
bankruptcy practice, it is the tool of choice to put a quick 
close to a bankruptcy case.  It avoids time, expense, and, 
some would say, the Bankruptcy Code’s unbending rules.  
The issue at the core of this appeal, which arises from such a 
sale, is whether certain payments by a § 363 purchaser (here 
an entity formed by the secured lenders of the debtors) in 
connection with acquiring the debtors’ assets should be 
distributed according to the Code’s creditor-payment 
hierarchy.        
To give some color to this issue, the secured lenders 
here were owed more than the value of the debtors’ assets, 
making them undersecured.  They acquired the assets by 
crediting approximately 90% of the secured debt they were 
owed.  No cash changed hands.  (This purchase mechanism is 
known in bankruptcy parlance as a “credit bid.”)  The only 
cash payments made in connection with the deal were those 
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the secured lenders deposited in escrow for professional fees 
and paid directly to the unsecured creditors.  We conclude, as 
we explain more fully below, that neither of the two payments 
went into or came out of the bankruptcy estate.  Thus the cash 
was not subject to the Code’s distribution priority.                       
I. BACKGROUND 
A. LifeCare’s Business Troubles 
At the start of 2012, LifeCare Holdings, Inc. 
(“LifeCare”),1 once a leading operator of long-term acute care 
hospitals, was struggling financially.  Management blamed its 
condition on Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of three of the 
company’s facilities and growth-stunting federal regulations 
that followed the 2005 natural disaster.  Because of the 
weight of its debt load ($484 million, of which approximately 
$355 million was secured), new capital was hard to find.  As 
a result, management considered two transactions that would 
salvage it as a going concern: a sale or a restructuring of its 
balance sheet.     
The sale didn’t happen initially because none of 
LifeCare’s suitors (there were at least seven of them) offered 
an amount that exceeded its debt obligations.  The best 
offer—submitted by one of LifeCare’s biggest competitors—
reflected a recovery to the secured lenders of only 80-85%.  
Management considered that option inadequate and thus was 
left with the restructuring alternative.  To go that route, 
however, it needed the support of its secured lenders.  But 
they had another idea.  Rather than support a restructuring of 
                                              
1  LifeCare while in Chapter 11 was referred to as “LCI.”  Per 
its plan of reorganization it became “ICL.”  Hence we simply 




LifeCare’s balance sheet, the secured lenders wanted to 
purchase the company outright—that is, all of its cash and 
assets.  To that end, they offered to credit $320 million of the 
$355 million debt they were then owed.   
Because their credit bid was LifeCare’s best (and only) 
alternative to liquidation under Chapter 7, the company 
agreed to part with all of its assets, including cash.  To 
memorialize the proposed sale, the secured lender group 
(through an acquisition vehicle called Hospital Acquisition, 
LLC2) entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with 
LifeCare in December 2012.     
 In addition to its credit bid, the purchaser agreed to 
pay the legal and accounting fees of LifeCare and the 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and to 
pick up the tab for the company’s wind-down costs.  Because 
the professionals hadn’t completed their work, the agreement 
directed the purchaser to deposit cash funds into separate 
escrow accounts.  Any money that went unspent had to be 
returned to it.   
B. LifeCare Files for Bankruptcy 
LifeCare and its 34 subsidiaries, which together 
operated 27 long-term acute care hospitals in 10 states and 
had about 4,500 employees, filed for bankruptcy one day after 
entering into the Asset Purchase Agreement.3  Among the 
                                              
2  For convenience, we refer to the buyer interchangeably as 
the secured lender group, the secured lenders, or simply the 
purchaser.  
 
3  The cases were subsequently consolidated for procedural 
purposes.  The separate corporate identities of LifeCare’s 
subsidiaries are irrelevant to this appeal.        
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company’s first requests was permission to sell substantially 
all of its assets through a Court-supervised auction under 11 
U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).  After receiving the go-ahead from the 
Bankruptcy Court, LifeCare marketed its assets to over 106 
potential strategic and financial counterparties.  In the end, 
however, the secured lender group’s $320 million credit bid 
remained the most attractive offer.  According to the 
testimony of LifeCare’s advisor from Rothschild, Inc., many 
of the putative bidders were concerned with “reimbursement 
issues and the challenging regulatory environment facing the 
long-term acute care industry.”  Hence they were unwilling to 
offer LifeCare an amount commensurate with the debt relief 
put forward by the secured lenders.     
Though the secured lender group was selected by 
default as the successful bidder, the sale was not yet a done 
deal.  Two important players in the bankruptcy case, the 
Committee and United States Government—neither of which 
would recover anything if the Court approved the sale—
objected to the asset transfer.  The former criticized it as a 
“veiled foreclosure” that would leave the bankruptcy estate so 
insolvent even administrative expenses would not be paid.  
The Government, for its part, argued that the sale would 
result in capital-gains tax liability estimated at $24 million, 
giving it an administrative claim that would go unpaid.  This 
was unfair, it maintained, because under the proposed sale 
arrangement equally situated administrative claimants—
primarily the bankruptcy professionals—would get paid if the 
sale went through.              
As is not uncommon, however, and before its 
objections to the sale reached resolution, the Committee 
struck a deal with the secured lender group.  In exchange for 
the Committee’s promise to drop its objections and support 
the sale, the secured lenders agreed to deposit $3.5 million in 
trust for the benefit of the general unsecured creditors.  The 
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compromise was embodied in a Term Sheet (which we refer 
to as the “Settlement Agreement” or “Settlement”) that was 
submitted to the Bankruptcy Court together with the sale 
materials, but later resubmitted in a stand-alone motion for 
the Court’s approval.    
C. The Sale Hearing 
On April 2, 2013 the Bankruptcy Court approved the 
proposed sale from the bench.  Applying the “sound business 
purpose” test, which bankruptcy courts use to decide whether 
to approve a § 363 sale, see In re Montgomery Ward Holding 
Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 153–54 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999), the Court 
described LifeCare’s condition as getting progressively 
worse; in bankruptcy talk, it was a “melting ice cube.”  The 
only way to avoid liquidation (a potential threat to LifeCare’s 
patients and a result that would leave the unsecured creditors 
and the Government with nothing) and allow the company to 
continue as a going concern was through a quick sale.  The 
Court’s order approving the sale noted that (1) it was the only 
alternative to liquidation and best opportunity to realize the 
full value of LifeCare’s assets, (2) the offer accepted was “the 
best and only one,” and (3) a plan of reorganization would not 
have yielded as favorable an economic result.  The Court also 
found that the parties gave proper notice of the sale and that 
the purchaser paid a fair and reasonable sum and acted in 
good faith.  Finally, and important for our purposes, the Court 
addressed the Government’s Code-based fairness objection.  
Deeming the administrative fee monies put in escrow by the 
purchaser not to be estate property, those funds weren’t 
subject to distribution to LifeCare’s creditors, and thus the 
Government had no claim to any of it.   
The Court reserved judgment on the proposed 
settlement until a later date.  
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D. The Settlement Hearing 
A bankruptcy court’s approval of a settlement 
agreement is not a fait accompli.  The settlement must be 
“fair and equitable.”  Prospective Comm. for Indep. 
Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 
U.S. 414, 424 (1968).  To determine if it is, courts in this 
Circuit apply the four-factor test set out in In re Martin, 91 
F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996), which balances the “value of 
the claim that is being compromised against the value to the 
estate of the acceptance of the compromise proposal.”  In re 
World Health Alternatives, Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 296 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The test 
requires a court to weigh (whether in response to a challenge 
or on its own): “(1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) 
the likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the 
litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay 
necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the 
creditors.”  In re Martin, 91 F.3d at 393.      
At the settlement hearing the Bankruptcy Court 
addressed the Government’s argument that, assuming the 
settlement money was property of the estate (which the 
Government believed the money was), bypassing it and 
paying the unsecured creditors disturbed the Code’s priority 
scheme for the payment of creditors.  Thus, regardless 
whether the Settlement satisfied the Martin factors, it was 
unlawful.  As the Government’s lawyer put it, the “proposed 
[$3.5 million] settlement attempts to distribute estate property 
to junior creditors over the objection of a senior creditor in 
violation of the absolute priority rule[,]4 and so therefore, it 
                                              
4 A prominent academic (and former Bankruptcy Judge) has 
aptly described the absolute priority rule as one of “vertical 
equity,” see Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair 
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cannot be approved.”  May 28, 2013 Hr’g Tr. 25:13–16.  But 
the Court rejected this contention, maintaining that, because 
the Settlement Agreement “permits a distribution directly to 
the unsecured creditors” from the purchaser, it is “an 
indication that [the funds] are not property of [LifeCare’s] 
estate[,] and as such, the absolute priority rule . . . is not 
implicated.”  Id. at 75:4–8.  Addressing the Martin factors, 
the Court approved the Settlement, stating that the creditors’ 
objection had a very small chance of success and thus their 
$3.5 million payday was an excellent outcome.   
E. The Government’s Appeal and Stay Request 
 The Government appealed from both the sale order 
and the Court’s approval of the Settlement and sought to stay 
the effect of those decisions.  At the stay hearing, the 
Government made clear its intent was not to stop the sale but 
to alter the part of the sale order that provides for the payment 
of professional fees and wind-down expenses.  Likewise, it 
argued that the distributional terms of the Settlement 
Agreement should be modified to follow the Code’s payment-
priority scheme.  But the Court again disagreed with the 
                                                                                                     
Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 227, 228-
29, 231 (1998)—junior creditors do not receive distributions 
under plans of reorganization until more senior creditors, 
unless they consent, are paid or allocated value in full.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b).  This is distinguished from “horizontal 
equity,” Markell, supra, at 227-28, 231, whereby creditors of 
the same priority rank receive proportionally equal 
distributions of estate property.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 
1123(a)(4), 1129(b)(1) (each to the extent they concern unfair 
discrimination); see also Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan 
Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy 
of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1375, 1403. 
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Government’s assessment and denied its stay request.  See 
June 11, 2013 Hr’g Tr. at 34:9-12 (noting that there was 
nothing in the record on which to “base a finding that the 
funds being held, in effect, in trust for other creditors, for 
other parties and specifically pursuant to a contract, . . . are [] 
property of the estate”).    
The Government appealed the denial of its request for 
a stay to the District Court.  But it too thought the 
Government had a weak case on the merits, agreeing with the 
Bankruptcy Court that the funds at issue were not property of 
the estate and thus not subject to the Code’s distribution rules.  
See App. at 11 (deferring to the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, 
which was based on “a voluminous and uncontested record 
supplemented by the argument and testimony presented at 
several hearings . . . that the sale was warranted and the funds 
at issue belonged to the purchaser [and] not the estate”).  
Thus the District Court denied the stay request, concluding 
that the Government didn’t make the threshold showing of a 
sufficient likelihood of success on the merits.    
 The Government appeals the approval of both the sale 
order and the Settlement.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
II. Analysis 
The Government raises two issues.  Did the 
Bankruptcy Court err in approving a provision of the sale of 
LifeCare’s assets under which the secured lender group 
agreed to pay some administrative claims but not others of 
equal priority?  And did it err in approving the distributional 
terms of the Committee and secured lender group’s 
Settlement, which resulted in a $3.5 million payday for the 
unsecured creditors even though a senior creditor—namely 
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the Government—received nothing?  Before we can get to 
these issues, we must resolve the following questions: 
(a) Is the Government’s appeal moot, be it 
constitutionally, statutorily or 
equitably? 
(b) Were the funds paid to administrative 
claimants under the escrow 
arrangement approved by the Sale 
Order, or to the unsecured creditors per 
approval of the Settlement Agreement, 
property of LifeCare’s estate? 
A. Mootness 
LifeCare and the Committee contend that 
constitutional, statutory and equitable mootness bar our 
review of the Government’s challenge to the escrowed funds 
set up by the Asset Purchase Agreement as well as the $3.5 
million deposited in trust by the purchaser for the unsecured 
creditors.      
1. Constitutional Mootness 
LifeCare’s constitutional mootness argument stems 
from the secured lender group retaining, after its credit bid is 
applied, a $35 million first priority lien on all property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  Thus, LifeCare’s argument proceeds, the 
Government would be entitled to no relief (making its case 
moot) even if the escrowed funds were deemed estate 
property, as the funds would go to the secured lenders.  We 
disagree.  “[A] case ‘becomes moot [in the constitutional 
sense] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any 
effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” Chafin v. 
Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. 
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Employees, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)). “‘As long as the 
parties have a [concrete] interest, however small, in the 
outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.’” Id. (quoting 
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287).  We have that here.  The 
Government has a $24 million administrative claim that will 
go unpaid if the distributional terms of the escrowed funds are 
left undisturbed.  Though the prospect of recovery might be 
remote, we cannot say it is impossible.  Hence the 
Government’s appeal is not constitutionally moot, and we 
have jurisdiction to consider whether it is entitled to a piece 
of the pie.            
2. Statutory Mootness 
Moving to statutory mootness, because the underlying 
asset sale was conducted under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which authorizes the sale of estate property outside the 
ordinary course of business, it implicates 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  
That provision moots any challenge to a § 363 sale that 
“affect[s] the validity of [the] sale” so long as “the purchaser 
acted in good faith and the appellant failed to obtain a stay of 
the sale.”  3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 363.11 (16th ed. 2013).   
Subsection (m) reads in full (save for words not 
relevant here): 
The reversal or modification on appeal of an 
authorization . . . of a sale or lease of property 
does not affect the validity of a sale or lease 
under such authorization to an entity that 
purchased or leased such property in good faith, 
whether or not such entity knew of the 
pendency of the appeal, unless such 
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed 
pending appeal.  
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11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  “[I]ts certainty attracts investors and 
helps effect[] debtor rehabilitation.”  Cinicola v. 
Scharffenberg, 248 F.3d 110, 122 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Collier at ¶ 363.11).  Without it, the risk of litigation would 
chill prospective bidders or push them to “demand a steep 
discount.”  In re River West Plaza-Chicago, LLC, 664 F.3d 
668, 671 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 
998 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
To give effect to § 363(m)’s purpose, some courts 
“limit[] the appealability of a Section 363 sale order . . . to the 
issue of the purchaser’s good faith.”  In re Motors Liquidation 
Co., 430 B.R. 65, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  Under that view, if the 
objecting party fails to obtain a stay of the sale, appellate 
review “is statutorily limited to the narrow issue of whether 
the property was sold to a good faith purchaser.”  Id. (quoting 
Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 105 F.3d 
837, 839 (2d Cir. 1997)).  By contrast, we interpret subsection 
363(m) more broadly and will review any sale-challenge that 
doesn’t “affect the validity of the sale.”  Cinicola, 248 F.3d at 
128.  Stated another way, so long as we can “grant effective 
relief,” § 363(m) doesn’t bar appellate review.  Pittsburgh 
Food & Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 
1997).  Thus the question we need to answer is whether we 
can give the Government the relief it seeks—“a 
redistribution” of the escrowed funds for administrative 
expenses and settlement proceeds to unsecured creditors, 
Reply Br. at 11—without disturbing the sale.   
LifeCare and the Committee both argue we cannot.  
LifeCare contends that, if we reallocate the escrowed funds, 
this will change a “fundamental term[] of the transaction” and 
deprive it of a key bargained-for benefit.  LifeCare Br. at 5.  
Similarly, the Committee asserts that the settlement “cannot 
be reversed without affecting the validity of the sale,” 
Committee Br. at 12, and, like LifeCare, it will be deprived of 
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a key deal term, as it “would not have withdrawn its objection 
to the sale without payment,” id. at 14.  
We disagree with both positions.  The provision 
stamps out only those challenges that would claw back the 
sale from a good-faith purchaser.  It does not moot “every 
term that might be included in a sale agreement,” even if each 
is technically “integral to that transaction.”  Reply Br. at 10 
(emphasis in original).  And, while § 363(m) aims to make 
sales of estate property final and inject predictability into the 
sale process, we don’t think it does so at all costs and 
certainly not for non-purchasers.  Thus we fail to see how 
§ 363(m) bars our review.   
3. Equitable Mootness 
 Finally, the Committee contends the Government’s 
appeal is equitably moot because the Government was 
unsuccessful in obtaining a stay of the Settlement Order and 
it’s too late to undo the compromise because over $2 million 
has already been distributed.  But, even if it is right about the 
consequences, the Committee’s reliance on the doctrine of 
equitable mootness misses the mark.  In re SemCrude, L.P., 
728 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2013), makes clear that the doctrine 
“comes into play in bankruptcy (so far as we know, its only 
playground) after a plan of reorganization is approved.”  Id. at 
317.  Outside the plan context, we have yet to hold that 
equitable mootness would cut off our authority to hear an 
appeal, and do not do so here.  And though we are 
sympathetic to the Committee’s position that it cannot 
recover its ability to object to a sale it viewed as unfair, we 
also note that without the Settlement Agreement it would 
have received nothing, thus cancelling (or at least mitigating) 
the claimed unfairness of considering the Government’s 
appeal.      
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B. The Merits 
On the merits the Government argues that the 
escrowed funds and settlement money were proceeds paid to 
obtain LifeCare’s assets, and thus qualify as estate property 
that should have been (but wasn’t) paid out according to the 
Code’s creditor-payment scheme.  Included within that 
scheme, the argument proceeds, are that equally ranked 
creditors must receive equal payouts and lower ranked 
creditors can’t be paid a cent until higher ranking creditors 
are paid in full.  The Government contends both principles 
were violated—the former because the similarly situated 
bankruptcy professionals were paid though the Government 
was not, the latter because it received none of the settlement 
money earmarked for the lower priority unsecured creditors.    
The Government’s argument relies on two key 
premises.  The first is that the escrowed funds for 
professionals and settlement proceeds for unsecured creditors 
were property of the estate.  (The Code’s distribution rules 
don’t apply to nonestate property.)  The second is that the 
priority-enforcing Code rules apply here even if textually 
most (save for § 507) are limited to the plan context.  We 
begin (and end) with the first issue.          
1. Are either the escrowed funds or settlement 
proceeds property of LifeCare’s estate? 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) defines property of the estate as 
“proceeds . . . of or from property of the estate.”  Thus, if 
either the escrowed funds or settlement sums are “proceeds of 
or from property of the estate,” they qualify as estate 
property.  We go out of turn and start with the settlement 
monies, as this is the easier issue. 
18 
 
a. The Settlement Sums 
The Bankruptcy Court held that, because the 
settlement monies were paid directly to the unsecured 
creditors from a trust funded by the purchaser and not given 
in exchange for any estate property, those funds were not 
property of LifeCare’s estate.  The Government contends the 
Court erred because the secured lenders’ payment to the 
Committee was in substance an increased bid for LifeCare’s 
assets.  In other words, the purchaser “agreed to a price it was 
willing to pay to acquire the debtors’ assets,” but “later had to 
increase its offer . . . to secure its successful bid.”  Gov’t Br. 
at 36.  Thus, the argument goes, the settlement sums should 
be treated as estate property.      
  We are not persuaded.  Though it is true that the 
secured lenders paid cash to resolve objections to the sale of 
LifeCare’s assets, that money never made it into the estate.  
Nor was it paid at LifeCare’s direction.  In this context, we 
cannot conclude here that when the secured lender group, 
using that group’s own funds, made payments to unsecured 
creditors, the monies paid qualified as estate property.  For 
these points we find instructive In re TSIC, 393 B.R. 71 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008).  There, as here, the unsecured 
creditors launched objections to the winning bid at a § 363 
auction.  See id. at 74.  Before the sale closed, the purchaser 
and creditors’ committee agreed that the latter would drop its 
objection if the former funded a trust account for the benefit 
of unsecured creditors.  See id. The United States trustee, 
relying principally on In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 
F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005), contended that the settlement 
violated the proscription against paying lower-statured 
creditors before higher ones.  But the Bankruptcy Court 
disagreed.  It held that, in contrast to Armstrong—which dealt 
with a gift of estate property from a senior creditor to a junior 
creditor over an intermediate creditor’s objection—the 
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purchaser’s “funds [were] not proceeds from a secured 
creditor’s liens, do not belong to the estate, and will not 
become part of the estate even if the Court does not approve 
the Settlement.”  In re TSIC, 393 B.R. at 77.  And the trustee 
presented no evidence that the settlement funds “were 
otherwise intended for the Debtor’s estate.”  Id. at 76.  All are 
true here: the settlement sums paid by the purchaser were not 
proceeds from its liens, did not at any time belong to 
LifeCare’s estate, and will not become part of its estate even 
as a pass-through.  
  Moving to the Government’s next argument, we are 
similarly unpersuaded by its reliance on the Committee’s 
purported concession in its settlement-approval motion that 
the parties’ compromise “represents an agreement between 
the Buyer, the Lenders and the Committee to allocate 
proceeds derived from the sale.”  App. at 519 (emphasis 
added).  Like the Bankruptcy Court, we decline to elevate 
form over substance and give legal significance to the 
Committee’s description of the settlement funds.  Our focus is 
on whether the settlement proceeds were given as 
consideration for the assets bought at the § 363 sale.  The 
evidence we have leads us to conclude they were not.   
b. The Escrowed Funds 
Whether the professional fees and wind-down 
expenses (which make up the escrowed funds) qualify as 
property of the estate is a more difficult question.  As noted, 
the Bankruptcy Court held that the funds did not so qualify 
because they “belong[ed] to the purchaser[] [and] not to the 
debtors’ estate.”  June 11, 2013 Hr’g Tr. 34:1.  The 
Government urges us to reverse that ruling because the funds 
were listed in subsections 3.1(a) and (b) of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement as part of the purchase price (indeed, they were 
called “[c]onsideration”) for LifeCare’s assets and thus 
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qualify as estate property under Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6) 
(including as property of the estate “proceeds” from a 
debtor’s asset sale).  Though aspects of the Government’s 
argument are factually correct, we cannot ignore the 
economic reality of what actually occurred.            
Subsection 2.1(l) of the Asset Purchase Agreement 
makes clear that the secured lender group purchased all of 
LifeCare’s assets, including its cash, by crediting $320 
million owed by LifeCare to the secured lenders.  Thus, once 
the sale closed, there technically was no more estate property.  
Put another way, getting $320 million of its secured debt 
forgiven resulted in the secured lender group getting all the 
property of LifeCare.  This is an important point.  The 
Government’s argument presumes that any residual cash from 
the sale—namely the monies earmarked for fees and wind-
down costs—would become property of LifeCare.  See Reply 
Br. at 20–21 (arguing that “if [the value of LifeCare’s] cash is 
said to have been paid as part of the ‘purchase price,’ . . . it 
cannot be said to remain the property of the purchaser”) 
(emphases added).  But that is impossible because LifeCare 
agreed to surrender all of its cash.  And, per the sale order, 
whatever remains of the $1.8 million in escrow goes back to 
where it came from—the secured lenders’ account (as indeed 
happened by the time of oral argument to over $800,000 
placed into escrow).  Thus, as a matter of substance, we 
cannot conclude that the escrowed funds were estate property.   
All that said, we recognize that, in the abstract, it may 
seem strange for a creditor to claim ownership of cash that it 
parted with in exchange for something.  See Reply Br. at 21.  
But in this context it makes sense.  Though the sale 
agreement gives the impression that the secured lender group 
agreed to pay the enumerated liabilities as partial 
consideration for LifeCare’s assets, it was really “to 
facilitate . . . a smooth . . . transfer of the assets from the 
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debtors’ estates to [the secured lenders]” by resolving 
objections to that transfer.  June 11, 2013 Hr’g Tr. 23:9–13.  
To assure that no funds reached LifeCare’s estate, the secured 
lenders agreed to pay cash for services and expenses through 
escrow arrangements.   
In this respect, an interesting argument the 
Government could have made, but didn’t, is that the escrowed 
funds resemble elements of an ordinary carve-out—best 
understood as “an arrangement under which secured creditors 
permit the use of a portion of their collateral [that is, estate 
property] to pay administrative costs, such as attorney fees,” 
and something the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors and 
secured lenders to agree to in the normal course.5  Harvey R. 
Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third 
Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate 
Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute 
Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 
55 Am. U. L. Rev. 1345, 1390-1412 (2006); see also Richard 
B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know About Carve 
Out, 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 445, 449 (2002) (maintaining that 
while “the carve out protects the professionals, [] it also may 
benefit the secured creditor, which might have concluded that 
an orderly liquidation or restructuring process is likely to 
result in the highest net recovery on its claim, even after 
                                              
5  Typically a carve-out is established at the outset of a 
bankruptcy case in a cash-collateral order where “a specific 
amount of the cash collateral, either in existence or to be 
generated, is earmarked for the payment of counsel fees.”  In 
re U.S. Flow Corp., 332 B.R. 792, 795 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2005) (quoting Harvis Trien & Beck, P.C. v. Federal Loan 
Mortgage Corp. (In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P.), 187 B.R. 




payment of carve out expenses” (emphasis added)); Charles 
W. Mooney, Jr., The (Il)Legitimacy of Bankruptcies for the 
Benefit of Secured Creditors, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 735, 750 
(noting that “[i]t is not unusual for a secured creditor to carve 
out from proceeds of its collateral funds to cover professional 
fees and other administrative expenses”).  Thus, the argument 
would go, if the escrowed funds indeed resemble an ordinary 
carve-out, then for that reason alone they should be treated as 
estate property. 
Ultimately the argument fails, for the difference 
between a carve-out and what we have here is the obvious.  
We are not dealing with collateral (if we were, this would 
suggest it was LifeCare’s property) but with the purchaser’s 
property because the payments by the purchaser were of its 
own funds and not LifeCare’s bankruptcy estate.6     
* * * * * 
                                              
6 In re DBSD North America, Inc., 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 
2011), a case the Government relies on heavily, is not to the 
contrary.  The only question there was whether, in the context 
of a plan of reorganization, an “undersecured . . . [creditor] 
entitled to the full residual value of the debtor [was] free to 
‘gift’ some of that value” to a shareholder of the debtor.  Id. at 
94.  While the Second Circuit Court answered no—holding 
that “secured creditors could have demanded a plan in which 
they received all of the reorganized corporation, but, having 
chosen not to, they may not surrender part of the value of the 
estate for distribution to the stockholder as a gift,” id. at 99 
(internal quotation marks omitted)—the Court said nothing 
about whether a lender can distribute nonestate property to a 
lower-ranked creditor.    
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  As noted, the Bankruptcy Code’s creditor-payment 
hierarchy only becomes an issue when distributing estate 
property.  Thus, even assuming the rules forbidding equal-
ranked creditors from receiving unequal payouts and lower-
ranked creditors from being paid before higher ranking 
creditors apply in the § 363 context, neither was violated 
here.     
